Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer

Articles

Vol. 34 No. 3 (2014)

Presidential control of the legislative agenda in Latin America

DOI
https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2014000300001
Submitted
December 20, 2019
Published
2019-12-20

Abstract

This paper analyzes the conditions under which presidents dominate the legislative agenda. To address this issue we analyze the governmental period of 30 Latin American Presidents, developing a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The analysis highlights that the combination of a favorable institutional design and a division of Congress in different ideological blocs favors the Executive branch. Two other conditions, reliance on a parliamentary majority and the absence of party fragmentation, are combined with the above elements to ensure the predominance of the Executive. The findings of this comparative study are confirmed by a supplementary statistical analysis.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.